Special Report

Koury case involving CentCom warrants no review

By Matthew Korade
Star Senior Writer
11-10-2003

It has been four years since Capt. Chris Koury felt his life tumble, four years since his superiors allegedly tarnished and tossed him away for discovering a potential security breach at U.S. Central Command. Koury, of Weaver, alleges his supervisors did not properly investigate the existence of answering machines at CentCom that were equipped with a special remote-monitoring feature for any potential breach of national security; that they covered up the possible problem, terminated his orders and brought him up on false charges. His allegations have garnered a letter from the Department of Defense inspector general’s office: His case does not warrant further review, it read. Koury has asked for several reviews of his allegations since his orders were terminated in 1999, always with the same result. This time, the request for review went through Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Ala. "Captain Koury, I am glad that my office could be of assistance to you," read the cover letter Rogers’ office enclosed with the DOD response. Rob Jesmer, Rogers’ chief of staff, said he sympathizes with Koury, "in the sense that he really believes he has a case. However, it seems DOD is satisfied with their internal investigation." Koury says he isn’t surprised by the Department of Defense’s response. He hopes it isn’t the end of the matter. "Honestly, it’s insulting," Koury said. "They have an opportunity to right a longstanding wrong, and they choose to act as the protectionist organization that I know they’ve come to be." In the inspector general’s letter dated Oct. 2, Communications Director John Crane wrote that his office requested the Defense Intelligence Agency review the matter, because it is the organization that oversees the type of high-security areas where the answering machines were found, called SCIFs, or sensitive compartmented information facilities. The agency determined the answering machines did not constitute a security violation, Crane wrote. The DOD security manual defines a security violation as the compromise of classified information, he wrote. However, the existence of the machines in the SCIFs was more appropriately defined as a "practice dangerous to security," something that could cause the potential compromise of classified information. Thus, he wrote, it did not require an investigation. As many as 100 machines were in the SCIFs for up to a year, accessible to anyone by calling in and dialing a personal security code, according to interviews with several intelligence officers including Koury, and testimony given during a 1999 CentCom investigation of events surrounding their discovery. The special monitoring feature was designed to allow people to listen in at home or office while away. But Koury suspected at least one person at CentCom had used the machines to eavesdrop on private conversations in the SCIFs, and he reported his suspicion to security officials. As for Koury’s allegation that his superiors reprised against him in an attempt to cover up the potentially embarrassing situation, Crane wrote his office had previously reviewed that charge, in 2000 and again in 2002 at the request of Sen. Jeff Sessions, R-Ala., and found both times that it had no merit. "We have sufficiently investigated the alleged reprisal issue, and Capt. Koury provides no new information that would warrant further investigative effort by this office," Crane wrote.