The Anniston Star, to its credit, is one of the shining lights in the Alabama constitutional reform movement. Its editorials and commentaries regularly shout the "damnations" and "hallelujahs" of reformist gospel so popular among state journalists.

In the past year, for example, The Star and other newspapers have called the 1901 Constitution a "filthy document" and "evil scheme" of racism, selfishness and other monstrosities. Alabamians want constitutional reform, we are told; and a new Constitution eventually will prevail because the cause is just and even biblical.

Such hopeful-yet-preachy sentiments are common among Alabama's civic leadership. The prevailing idea is that, if "we the people" sermonize often enough and loudly enough, "the politicians" in Montgomery will surely repent of their sins and enact our righteous call for a new Constitution.

In fact, a cottage industry flourishes around various reform notions — cleaning up our campaigns, improving public education, promoting tax fairness, rendering justice to the poor, and other progressive causes — fixated, sometimes tortuously, on the Constitution. Journalists, educators, ministers, students, business people and other reformers constantly press Alabama's politicians to forsake our backward legacy of fundamental law.

Unfortunately, too many constitutional reformers see Montgomery as a wicked Jericho of corruption and intransigence, walled against the forces of righteousness. And, just as the biblical account tells how "the wall fell down flat," so too, they think, the politicians must eventually yield to the trumpeting, shouting reformers encircling Goat Hill.

Considering the track record of such righteous pleadings, it may be time to consider some different approaches to constitutional reform in Alabama.

A trite and tiresome mantra

Frankly, I'm concerned that the reform mantra has gotten trite and tiresome. Too often and for too long, the reform community has been in a rut of (a) moralizing about what's wrong with politics and government in this state, (b) proclaiming popular support for the reform-de-jour, (c) whipping ourselves into a frenzy about prospects for change, (d) patting ourselves on the back, (e) explaining another failure in Montgomery, and finally (f) cranking up the movement for next year's version of reform fantasy.

I hope my reform friends will bear with me as a longtime member of the family; but preaching about reform may not be enough. It may be time to add something extra — i.e., bold and practical politicking — to the movement.

* * * Lessons from Jericho

I'm no scholar of the Bible, so I'll not dwell on the historical details or theological debate about what happened at Jericho. But that story is a common depiction of righteous triumph; and it can serve as guidance for dealing with Alabama's political system.

To repeat the standard account, Joshua and his divinely inspired people marched around the walled city of Jericho seven times. "And it came to pass, when the people heard the sound of the trumpet, and the people shouted with a great shout, that the wall fell down flat, so that the people went up into the city, every man straight before him, and they took the city" (Joshua 6:20).

But Joshua obviously did more than parading. Joshua had sent spies into Jericho before the assault and had even collaborated with a prostitute inside the town; I imagine he thereby figured out where the wall's weak spots were and how to exploit the town's vulnerabilities.

Furthermore, Joshua had a 12-foot-long spear in his hand, a double-edged sword on his side, an army of soldiers following the priests — and they took Jericho in brutal combat, killing every man, woman, child, ox, sheep and ass in the city (he did spare the prostitute). In other words, practical planning and bold action accompanied the noisy dramatics of Joshua's righteous triumph.

* * * Reform and anti-reform in Alabama

The truth is that activist do-gooders are a relatively small crowd with limited power in Alabama political arena. For the most part, they lack personal relations with politicians; they haven't contributed significant money in political campaigns; and they don't command a lot of clout because average voters are not driven by civic reform issues. Many legislators support general reform ideas; but they don't run the show in Montgomery. Others simply disagree philosophically about reordering the state's traditional system. Still others are legitimately concerned about the possible ramifications of a constitutional convention for the democratic process. Then there's the hard-core opposition, consisting of entrenched politicians, advantaged interests and moneyed groups who like the system as it is.

Year after year, the process repeats itself with the same results for the reform agenda. The "system" is designed to prevent rather than foster change; and there are endless ways for anti-reformers to kill reform ideas without civic blood on their hands, while making it look like good government almost succeeded.

* * * My challenge for reformers

In my long experience, I have never seen significant reform of the political system that happened without a strategic game plan of civic righteousness, outside pressure and inside power.

I therefore propose that the constitutional reformers coordinate a disciplined alliance of progressive forces to directly impact the 2010 elections and to pursue a specific reform package during the following legislative session. The rationale of such an endeavor is to force prominent political leaders into a specific, public, "contractual" promise at an opportune point in a tight campaign. Then they can be forced to deliver constitutional reform.

* * * A Strategic Gameplan: CON-TRAC 2010

I've drafted a simple outline for such a plan — I call it CON-TRAC 2010, or "Contract To Reform Alabama's Constitution in 2010." It might operate in the following manner:

(1) CON-TRAC 2010 would structure timely, critical, deliverable, collective electoral support for whichever candidate for governor and lieutenant governor most strongly commits on constitutional reform. The group's members could require supported candidates to sign a CON-TRAC pledge that "I will not allow any legislation to be enacted until after the proposed constitutional reform package is passed and signed."

(2) The alliance would begin immediately with a statewide organizational conference — representative of Alabama residents, areas and groups — at which a detailed plan for grassroots action would be formally adopted for implementation in the campaign.

(3) An endorsement conference would be held two weeks before the general election, at which the assembled reformers would interview, discuss and endorse their chosen candidate or candidates for each office.

(4) Then the alliance would quickly send its civic army onto the electoral battlefield, mobilizing last-minute support for the endorsed candidates.

(5) Finally, CON-TRAC 2010 would have to follow-up by enforcing the reform mandate, through its muscular champions, inside the political system during the next legislative session.

Two Key Political Conditions

This strategy depends, of course, on two key, conditional developments.

The first condition — a tight electoral campaign — is not really in anybody's control. But I've examined the last five elections for governor and lieutenant governor, and odds are that the upcoming campaign will accommodate the strategy. In the combined 10 races from 1990 to 2006, six have been decided by less than 5 percent of the voters; four have been decided by only 1 percent of the electorate; and two have been decided by only a fraction of a percent.

Check the records: Gov. Guy Hunt beat Paul Hubbert by 4 percent in 1990; Gov. Fob James beat Jim Folsom by less than 1 percent in 1994; Lt. Gov. Steve Windom beat Dwayne Freeman by 1 percent in 1998; Gov. Bob Riley beat Don Siegelman by less than 1 percent in 2002; and Lt. Gov. Jim Folsom beat Luther Strange by 1 percent in 2006. It seems historically likely that the 2010 cycle might produce a similarly close race for one or both of these powerful positions. It also seems logical that the candidates would be very solicitous of the up-for-grabs reform community in such a situation just days before the election.

The second trickiest assignment is getting the reform community to round up and deliver a committed chunk of voters late in the election. But if it cannot pull this off with 1 to 2 percent of the Alabama electorate, then clearly a new constitution is not a priority in this state.

Time to put up or shut up

Speaking more bluntly than is my custom, I think it's time for do-gooders and politicians to put up or shut up! We need to do more than preach — and the upcoming election presents a golden opportunity to try a different approach.

I am not applying for the job of Joshua in this fight. My time has passed, and there are plenty of good leaders already involved in the constitutional reform movement. Also, I am not endorsing any particular reform plan; actually, I have serious concerns about the uncivic possibilities in such an endeavor. Furthermore, in no way do I guarantee reform success. Anyone who offers such a guarantee is foolish or irresponsible.

Thus, CON-TRAC 2010 is not a sure-fire game plan, but it seems to me that practical politicking is worth a try. If it fails, then we can always go back to marching, shouting and tooting our horns.

Dr. Glen Browder is a former U.S. congressman from Alabama and professor at Jacksonville State University.